By Ebrahimi
    
Washington, 2008 June 30, IRIB
 
In a 700-page study the New York Times reported Sunday that US Army officials confessed to their irreversible mistakes during the war Washington imposed on Iraq on the pretext of removing its former stooge, Saddam, and illegally occupied that country in March 2003.

The report found that, US-based generals handling the war in faraway Iraq thought their goals had been achieved in less than a month of the invasion of Iraq early 2003. US President George W. Bush's misleading statement claiming that "the mission is accomplished" reinforced the commanders' stance on a hasty conclusion, the study said.

The document was prepared by 200 military specialists in the US Army, both active and on duty officers and the retired. The report covered the period from May 2003 to January 2005.

The report said after Saddam's Ba'ath minority regime was removed from power, most US military commanders liked to believe that victory had already been achieved and that a post-combat Iraq would require only a limited number of operations in certain parts of the occupied country. Some commanders, however, told the compilers of the report that when asked about plans for making the country stable they got no answers and the situation did not go on as had been perceived earlier.

The lack of a post-war plan to handle the issues during the occupation was inserted as one the most important factors that led to the instability of Iraq under US occupation.

The report said the civilian and military planning for a post-Saddam Iraq was inadequate, and that the Army should have pushed the White House, Pentagon, as well as civil management for better planning and preparation.

On the reasons behind the mismanagement of the post-Saddam era by the occupiers, some US Army Commanders and congress representatives said the then Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was guilty of the wrong attitude.

The 700-page study indicated that field commanders requested more troops but they were ignored and that commanders in Baghdad were replaced without adequate replacements or enough staff. If the report is to be believed, war planners said 600,000 troops would be needed for the occupation. Even before the invasion, some planners had called for 600,000 troops to be sent for the invasion and occupation; but Rumsfeld ignored their request by stubbornly persisting on a small scale army comprising of less than 200,000 soldiers.

The revealing document said the post-war situation in Iraq was severely out of line with the suppositions made at nearly every level before the war, adding that it was clear in January 2005 that the US occupation army would prolong its illegal presence in Iraq for some time.